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ROB ONCE, SERVE TWICE?:
PUNISHMENT UNDER BOTH THE
FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT
AND THE HOBBS ACT VIOLATES
THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Jamie Zimmerman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (“FBRA”), proscribes
bank robbery and attempted bank robbery.1  To convict a defendant under the
FBRA, the government must prove that the defendant took (or attempted to
take) property in the custody of a financial institution through the use of force,
violence, or intimidation.2  Another federal criminal statute, the Hobbs Act,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951, proscribes extortion and robbery affecting com-
merce.3  To convict a defendant under the Hobbs Act, the government must
prove that the defendant took (or attempted to take) property from another
through the use of force, violence or fear of injury.4  In addition, convicting a
defendant under the Hobbs Act requires proof that the robbery obstructed,
delayed, or otherwise affected commerce.5  Conviction under either statute car-
ries a maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment.6
The language of both Acts governs bank robbery, such that the govern-
ment can elect to charge a defendant under either for a bank robbery offense.
Instead of sentencing a defendant to the maximum twenty years imprisonment
for a bank robbery offense exclusively under the FBRA, some courts punish
defendants under both Acts.  Sentencing a defendant under both Acts raises
double jeopardy concerns under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
Currently, there is a split among federal appellate courts as to whether
punishment under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act for bank robbery (or
* William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, J.D. Candidate, May
2009.
1 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006).
2 Id. § 2113(a).  Note that the FBRA also contains other offenses that the government can
charge a defendant with.  For the purposes of this Note, I limit the discussion of the FBRA to
the bank robbery (or attempted bank robbery) offense under subsection (a).
3 Id. § 1951.
4 Id. § 1951(a).
5 Id.
6 Id. §§ 1951(a), 2113(a).  Again, note that offenses other than bank robbery (or attempted
bank robbery) under subsection (a) of the FBRA carry lesser sentences.
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attempted bank robbery) violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Sixth,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have concluded that punishment under both Acts
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, whereas the Second and Eleventh Circuits
have concluded that it does not.7
Although I support prosecution for bank robbery, careful analysis on this
matter reveals that the law on this issue is definitive:  punishment under both
the FBRA and the Hobbs Act for bank robbery violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause.8  In this Note, I examine the current circuit-split and call for resolution
in accordance with the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits.  The following section
discusses the historical development of the Double Jeopardy Clause and
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding its prohibition against multiple punish-
ments.  Section III introduces the current circuit-split on the matter, discussing
the holdings and rationales of the federal appellate courts that have addressed
whether punishment under both Acts violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.9  In
Section IV, I propose that the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit-split in
favor of the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits and conclude that subjecting
defendants to multiple punishments under the FBRA and the Hobbs Act consti-
tutes a double jeopardy violation.  Additionally, Section IV urges the Supreme
Court to revisit its precedent permitting the government to charge defendants
with multiple indictments for the “same offense” and conclude that said prac-
tice also violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Finally, in Section V, I submit
that resolution of the circuit-split presents the Court with an opportunity to
restore teeth and integrity to the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against
multiple punishments.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
In order to fully appreciate the constitutional significance of indicting and
punishing defendants under the FBRA and the Hobbs Act for bank robbery,
one must first become familiar with the principles that lie at the root of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides in part, no person shall “be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”10  The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to provide many
protections for defendants.  Although it is typically thought of as prohibiting
subsequent prosecutions after trial, it in fact comprises “three separate constitu-
tional protections.”11  As Justice Stewart succinctly stated in North Carolina v.
7 Compare United States v. Holloway, 309 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2002), United States v. Golay,
560 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1977), and United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997 (6th Cir. 1975), with
United States v. Reddick, No. 05-13169, 2007 WL 1540210 (11th Cir. May 29, 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 204 (2007), and United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934 (2d
Cir. 1990).
8 Although I was originally intrigued by this topic because I worked as a bank teller for
several years and support aggressive prosecution of bank robbery offenses, the purpose of
this Note is to discuss the constitutional violation that arises when the government imposes
multiple punishments under both the Hobbs Act and the FBRA.
9 The research for this Note closed on December 15, 2008.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
11 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
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Pearce,12 the Double Jeopardy Clause:  “[P]rotects against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after conviction.  And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense.”13  In sum, the Clause prohibits defendants
from being subjected to double jeopardy for the “same offense.”
A. Roots of the Double Jeopardy Clause
Beginning in the mid-thirteenth century, English common law embraced
principles akin to the modern day protection against double jeopardy.14  The
common law incorporated double jeopardy principles in the form of the follow-
ing pleas: autrefoits acquit, autrefoits convict, and pardon.15  Sir William
Blackstone described the pleas in his Commentaries as follows:
First, [under] the plea of autrefroits acquit, or a former acquittal, . . . when a
man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution, before
any court having competent jurisdiction of the offence, he may plead such acquittal
in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime. . . . .  And so also was an
acquittal on an indictment a good bar to an appeal, by the common law . . . .
Secondly, the plea, of autrefroits convict, or a former conviction for the same
identical crime, though no judgment was ever given, or perhaps will be, . . . is a good
plea in bar to an indictment.
. . . .
Lastly, a pardon may be pleaded in bar; as at once destroying the end and pur-
pose of the indictment, by remitting that punishment, which the prosecution is calcu-
lated to inflict.16
The language of the Double Jeopardy Clause as it appears in the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution is no doubt traceable to Black-
stone.17  He explained the essence of the pleas as follows:  it is a “universal
maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeop-
ardy of his life, more than once, for the same offence.”18
Early American common law also embraced double jeopardy principles.
In enacting the Body of Liberties in 1691, colonial Massachusetts expressly
adopted a guarantee against double jeopardy.19  Paragraph 42 of the Body of
Liberties provided:  “[n]o man shall be twise [sic] sentenced by [c]ivill [sic]
[j]ustice for one and the same [c]rime, offence, or [t]respasse [sic].”20  Other
12 Pearce, 395 U.S. 711.
13 Id. at 717 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
14 See DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, DOUBLE JEOPARDY:  A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 4 (2004).  According to Rudstein, references of double jeopardy pro-
tection first appeared in the Talmud and the Old Testament. Id. at 1-2.
15 Id. at 4.
16 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 335-37 (London,
A. Strahan & W. Woodfall, 11th ed. 1791).
17 See GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY:  THE HISTORY, THE LAW 7 (1998)
(“Blackstone was almost certainly the source of the Double Jeopardy Clause language.”).
18 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 335.
19 RUDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 11.
20 Id. (quoting Massachusetts Body of Liberties, para. 42 (1641), reprinted in RICHARD L.
PERRY & JOHN C. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES:  DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDI-
VIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 153 (1959)).
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colonies followed suit thereafter and incorporated the guarantee against double
jeopardy in constitutions, legislation and case law.21
The constitutional history of the Double Jeopardy Clause is traceable to
James Madison, who submitted the Clause as part of the Bill of Rights to the
Continental Congress.22  The Clause ultimately became part of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution upon ratification by the states in
1791.23
Since ratification, the Supreme Court has interpreted the freedom from
double jeopardy to be a fundamental right.24  Other than recognition as a funda-
mental right, however, jurisprudence interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause
is inconsistent and evolving.  As Professor Akhil Reed Amar stated, “Modern
Supreme Court case law is full of double jeopardy double talk.”25
In the following Section, I provide a brief recitation of the Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the issues of multiple punishments and multiple indictments
for the “same offense.”
B. “Same Offense” Jurisprudence
An offense can be the “same” in one of two ways.  First, two offenses can
literally be the same, in that they both require proof of the exact same elements
to sustain conviction.26  Second, two offenses can be constructively the same,
in that although they require proof of different elements, they are nonetheless
the “same offense” because they require proof of the same facts.27
1. Multiple Indictments
Unlike most double jeopardy jurisprudence, the law concerning multiple
indictments is clear.  If a single criminal offense violates more than one crimi-
nal statute, the government may charge a defendant with indictments under
multiple statutes, regardless of whether the statutes proscribe the “same
offense.”28  In Ball v. United States,29 the Supreme Court condoned this prac-
tice.30  As a result, the only constraint on charging defendants with multiple
indictments for one criminal act lies with the district court, which retains the
21 Id. at 11-13.
22 See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 84. Madison originally proposed the language as follows:
“No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment
or one trial for the same offence.” Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789)).
23 See RUDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 15.
24 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
25 Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1807
(1997).
26 THOMAS, supra note 17, at 167.
27 Id.
28 See 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 142 (4th ed. 2008).
29 Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
30 Id. at 865 (“We emphasize that while the Government may seek a multiple-count indict-
ment against a felon for violations of §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) involving the same weapon
where a single act establishes the receipt and possession, the accused may not suffer two
convictions or sentences on that indictment.”).
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inherent discretion to limit the government’s authority to prosecute multiple
counts at trial.31
Proponents of charging defendants with multiple indictments for the
“same offense” argue that permitting the government to prosecute a defendant
under multiple counts at trial serves an important purpose in preserving judicial
economy.32  By prosecuting a defendant with multiple charges in a single pro-
ceeding, courts conserve time, lighten their dockets and save the expense of
seating multiple juries for different trials.33  Although judicial economy is the
primary policy asserted to justify charging defendants with multiple indict-
ments for one criminal act, it also benefits the defendant by preventing multiple
trials for a number of related offenses.34  Whereas multiple indictments for the
same offense are permissible, multiple punishments run afoul of the guarantee
against double jeopardy.35
2. Multiple Punishment
The Supreme Court has promulgated different versions of what is essen-
tially the same legal test to determine when two separate offenses, stemming
from two separate federal statutes, constructively constitute the “same offense”
such that punishing someone under both violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause.36  The existence of many different approaches to answer this legal
question reflects the disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices as to the
purpose the Clause should serve.37  As articulated by Professor Susan Klein,
The crux of the disagreement is the following.  If the Double Jeopardy Clause was
designed solely to limit the ability of prosecutors to charge a defendant successively
in contravention of legislative intent, then the Court should give legislatures free
reign to define crimes in any manner they choose.  The prosecutor would then be
bound to respect a legislature’s definition of an offense . . . .  If, on the other hand,
the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to protect defendants from being succes-
sively tried for identical conduct, then neither the legislature nor the prosecutor can
harass a defendant by repeated trials for that conduct.
This disagreement regarding from which governmental branch we are protecting
those accused of crimes has resulted in a stream of changing legal tests for determin-
ing whether statutorily defined offenses are the ‘same.’38
In other words, certain versions of the test provide that the purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is to circumscribe the authority of prosecutors to
charge defendants, whereas other versions provide that the purpose is to cir-
31 See United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A decision of
whether to require the prosecution to elect between multiplicitous counts before trial is
within the discretion of the trial court.”) (citing United States v. Throneburg, 921 F.2d 654,
657 (6th Cir. 1990)).
32 See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal Offenses:  A Review
of the Legal and Psychological Literature, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 340 (1985).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See RUDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 74-76.
36 See Susan R. Klein & Katherine P. Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions and Compound
Criminal Statutes:  A Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REV. 333, 363 (1998).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 363-64.
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cumscribe the authority of the legislature to criminalize identical conduct.  The
majority of the Court’s versions of this legal test have been rooted in the former
approach, which presupposes that the word “offense” carries an independent
meaning such that the government cannot charge a defendant more than once
for committing the “same offense.”39
a. Evolution of the “Same Offense” Test
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court articulated the first ver-
sion of the “same offense” test, in Ex parte Nielsen.40 The test is referred to as
the “essence of the offense” test, and is used to determine when multiple pun-
ishments violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.41  Under the “essence of the
offense” test, two statutes criminalized the “same offense” if both were aimed
at the same harm.42  At the time, the Court explicitly rejected adopting a test
considering the particular elements of each criminal statute, reasoning that such
a test would vest too much authority with the legislature.43
The Court replaced the “essence of the offense” test with the “same evi-
dence” test approximately twenty years later in Gavieres v. United States.44
Reflecting a departure from circumscribing the legislature’s authority, the
“same evidence” test provided that multiple punishments violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause only when use of the same evidence would support convic-
tions under both criminal statutes.45  The “same evidence” test was thus rooted
in the theory that the Double Jeopardy Clause serves to protect defendants from
prosecutorial abuse.
Two decades later, in Blockburger v. United States,46 the Court essentially
reaffirmed the applicability of the “same evidence” test, which became com-
monly known as the “Blockburger test.”47  At trial, a jury convicted Block-
burger of two separate offenses under the Harrison Narcotic Act for the same
sale of eight grains of morphine hydrochloride:  unlawful sale of a narcotic
drug “not in or from the original stamped package” and unlawful sale of a
narcotic drug “having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the
purchaser.”48  The trial court sentenced Blockburger under each offense.49  On
appeal, Blockburger argued that his sentences constituted multiple punishments
for a single offense.50  The Supreme Court affirmed the sentences, reasoning
that the sale of narcotics did not constitute the “same offense” because although
both offenses stemmed from the same sale, one offense required proof of an
39 Id.
40 Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
41 See Klein & Chiarello, supra note 36, at 364 (discussing Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 189).
42 Id. (“[t]he Court found that cohabitation and adultery were the ‘same’ offense because a
sexual relationship with the second ‘wife’ was in fact the bad conduct upon which the first
indictment was based.”). Id. at 365.
43 Id.
44 Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 343 (1911).
45 Id. at 343-44.
46 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
47 Id. at 304.
48 Id. at 301.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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original stamped package and the other required proof of the absence of a writ-
ten order.51  As different evidence is required to prove packing and absence of
a written order, the Court held that the charges were not the “same offense.”52
The Court articulated the test to determine if multiple punishments violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause as follows:  “where the same act or transaction consti-
tutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provi-
sion requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”53
In 1990, the Court replaced the Blockburger test, which it had applied to
multiple punishment challenges for more than fifty years, with a broader “same
conduct” test, adopted in Grady v. Corbin.54  The “same conduct” test did not
differ from the Blockburger test with respect to determining multiple punish-
ments.55  Rather, the test modified one of the other “three separate constitu-
tional protections” the Double Jeopardy Clause affords.56  The “same conduct”
test provided defendants with broader protections against subsequent prosecu-
tions by severely restricting the ability of a prosecutor to indict a defendant for
charges that would reintroduce evidence used in a prior trial, even if the new
charge or charges required proof of elements that the former charges did not.57
The “same conduct” test was short lived, however, and the Court returned to
the Blockburger test in 1993, in United States v. Dixon.58
b. Current Approach to Multiple Punishment Challenges
According to the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Johnson,59 the protection
against multiple punishments “is designed to ensure that the sentencing discre-
tion of courts is confined to the limits established by the legislature.”60  As
such, the “same offense” analysis under the Blockburger test cannot be per-
formed without reference to the legislature–both in what punishment it author-
ized by statute and in whether it expressly intended to impose multiple
punishments for the “same offense.”61  Thus, the current approach to determin-
ing whether multiple punishments violate the Double Jeopardy Clause is a
three-part inquiry.
First, as a threshold matter, a court must analyze the language of the statu-
tory offenses to determine if Congress intended to authorize punishment under
each statute.62  If two offenses are located in different sections of the United
States Code or in different chapters of the same section, courts presume that
Congress intended to authorize punishment under each statute.63
51 Id. at 303-04.
52 Id. at 304.
53 Id. 
54 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521-22 (1990).
55 See Klein & Chiarello, supra note 36, at 367.
56 Id.  See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
57 See Klein & Chiarello, supra note 36, at 367.
58 See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (overruling Grady, 495 U.S. 508).
59 Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984).
60 Id. at 499.
61 See RUDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 156.
62 See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 981 (2d. Cir. 1990).
63 Id.
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Second, to determine if both statutes proscribe the “same offense,” a court
applies the Blockburger test to inquire as to whether one of the criminal stat-
utes requires proof of an element that the other statute does not.64  This inquiry
is based on the facts of each case.65  Imposing multiple punishments on a
defendant presumptively violates the Double Jeopardy Clause if proof of the
same elements satisfies both criminal statutes.66  If, however, proof of an addi-
tional element is required to sustain a conviction under one of the statutes, then
punishment under both statutes does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.67
Lastly, if imposing multiple punishments on a defendant presumptively
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause under a Blockburger analysis, a court
must examine the legislative history of both charging statutes to determine if
Congress nonetheless intended to impose multiple punishments for committing
the “same offense.”68  As stated by Professor Rudstein, “[a]lthough the
Supreme Court in Blockburger appeared to be establishing the constitutional
standard for determining when cumulative punishments can be imposed in a
single proceeding . . . the Blockburger test is merely ‘a rule of statutory con-
struction.’”69  If the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress did not
intend for courts to punish defendants for the “same offense” under multiple
criminal statutes, then multiple punishments violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause.70  If, on the other hand, a review of the legislative history reveals that
Congress expressly intended to impose multiple punishments on defendants for
committing the same offense, then both sentences stand.71
III. DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Federal appellate courts that have reviewed double jeopardy challenges
regarding convictions and multiple punishments under both the FBRA and the
Hobbs Act have arrived at differing conclusions as to the viability of said prac-
tice.  The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded
that imposing punishment under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act for bank
robbery (or attempted bank robbery) violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.72
By contrast, the Second and Eleventh Circuits, have concluded that punishing a
64 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
65 See generally RUDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 74-76.
66 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
67 Id.
68 See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (“The Blockburger test is a ‘rule
of statutory construction,’ and because it serves as a means of discerning congressional pur-
pose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of
contrary legislative intent.”); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980).
69 RUDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 157.
70 Whalen, 445 U.S. at 694-96.
71 See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340; Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92); see also
United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 981 (2d Cir. 1990).
72 See generally United States v. Holloway, 309 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Golay, 560 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997 (6th Cir. 1975).
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defendant under the FBRA and the Hobbs Act does not violate the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.73
To analyze a double jeopardy challenge under the FBRA and the Hobbs
Act, one must first refer to the text of the statutes to determine what facts must
be proved to sustain a conviction under each.  The pertinent parts of the FBRA
provide:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by
extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the
care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any
savings and loan association . . . .
. . . .
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
. . . .
(f) As used in this section the term “bank” means any member bank of the
Federal Reserve System, and any bank, banking association, trust company, savings
bank, or other banking institution organized or operating under the laws of the United
States, including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as such terms are defined in
paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978), and
any institution the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.74
In other words, to convict a defendant under the FBRA, the government
must prove that the defendant took (or attempted to take) property in the cus-
tody of a financial institution through the use of force, violence, or
intimidation.75
To contrast, the pertinent provisions of the Hobbs Act provide:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both.
(b) As used in this section—
(1) The term “robbery” means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal
property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by
means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate
or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession,
or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone
in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
. . . . (3) The term “commerce” means commerce within the District of
Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce
between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of
Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points
within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other
commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.76
73 See generally United States v. Reddick, No. 05-13169, 2007 WL 1540210 (11th Cir. May
29, 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 204 (2007); Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934.
74 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006).
75 Id. § 2113(a).
76 Id. § 1951.
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In short, to convict a defendant under the Hobbs Act, the government must
prove that the defendant took (or attempted to take) property from another
through the use of force, violence or fear of injury.77  In addition, the govern-
ment must also prove that the robbery obstructed, delayed, or otherwise
affected interstate commerce.78
Based on a side-by-side comparison, both Acts require proof of an element
that the other does not.  The Hobbs Act requires proof of an affect on interstate
commerce, which is not required to sustain a conviction under the FBRA, and
the FBRA requires proof that the entity robbed was a “bank” as defined by the
statute, which is not a requirement for robbery under the Hobbs Act.
A. Camp 1:  Sentencing under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act Violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause
In this section, I discuss the cases from the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals, whereby the courts ruled that subjecting a defendant to
multiple punishments under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
1. United States v. Beck79
In 1975, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the first double jeopardy challenge for
multiple punishments under both Acts.  The following is a brief recitation of
the facts and circumstances at issue in United States v. Beck.
On December 29, 1972, defendant Richard Beck telephoned the manager
of the Frayser branch of the National Bank of Commerce in Memphis, Tennes-
see.80  Beck informed the manager that he had taken the manager’s wife and
grandchildren hostage and would not release them until he received $50,000 in
cash.81  The manager complied with Beck’s demands and left a cloth bag con-
taining the cash at the requested drop point.82  Beck collected the money from
the drop point and police apprehended him shortly thereafter.83  A grand jury
indicted Beck on two counts of bank extortion, under both the FBRA and the
Hobbs Act.84  The jury found Beck guilty on both counts and the trial court
sentenced Beck to concurrent twenty and ten-year prison terms under the
Hobbs Act and the FBRA, respectively.85
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court vacated the Hobbs Act conviction and
affirmed the FBRA conviction.86  Applying the Blockburger test, the court con-
cluded that punishment under both Acts resulted in a double jeopardy violation
because both Acts criminalize the “same offense”—proof of robbery of a
“bank” under the FBRA also proves an affect on commerce (as required under
77 Id. § 1951(a).
78 Id.
79 United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997 (6th Cir. 1975).




84 Id. at 999 n.4.
85 Id. at 998.
86 Id. at 999.
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the Hobbs Act).87  The court explained:  “precisely the same facts which permit
judicial notice of the interstate nature of a national bank’s operations, without
addition or modification, provide the basis for it and a conviction under [the
FBRA].”88
In addition, the Sixth Circuit concluded that indictment under both the
FBRA and the Hobbs Act was proper; reasoning that joinder of charges under
both Acts did not result in the admission of evidence that would have been
prejudicial to the defendant at trial.89
2. United States v. Golay90
Two years after the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Beck, the Eighth
Circuit Court addressed the issue of multiple punishments under both Acts and
followed suit with its sister circuit before it.  In United States v. Golay, the trial
court sentenced defendant George Golay to concurrent twenty and twenty-five
year imprisonment sentences under the Hobbs Act and the FBRA, respectively,
for his participation in a bank robbery.91  Golay appealed the sentences on
double jeopardy grounds.92
Applying the Blockburger test, the Eighth Circuit concluded that punish-
ment under both statutes violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because proof of
the same facts required to sustain a conviction under the FBRA also satisfied
the statutory elements necessary to sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act.93
Finding the robbery elements under both criminal statutes to be the same, the
court turned to proof of the commerce element under the Hobbs Act and rea-
soned, “banks are accustomed to operating on an interstate level,” and proof of
robbery of a financial institution “necessarily meet[s] the obstruction of com-
merce requirement under the Hobbs Act.”94  The Eighth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case, instructing the trial court to remedy the illegal sentence it
imposed.95
The Eighth Circuit analogized sentencing a defendant under both the
FBRA and the Hobbs Act for bank robbery to a classic multiple punishment
double jeopardy violation the Supreme Court identified in Prince v. United
States.96  In Prince, the trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years
imprisonment under subsection (a) of the FBRA for entering a bank with intent
to commit robbery and twenty years imprisonment for armed bank robbery
under subsection (d) of the FBRA.97  The defendant moved for a reduction in
87 Id. at 1000.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 United States v. Golay, 560 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1977).
91 Id. at 867.  A brief recitation of the facts are not provided here, as the Eighth Circuit did
not discuss the factual circumstances concerning Golay’s participation in the bank robbery in
its double jeopardy analysis.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 869-70.
94 Id. at 870.
95 Id. at 871.
96 Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 329 (1957).
97 See Prince v. United States, 230 F.2d 568, 569 (5th Cir. 1956).
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his sentence, which the district court denied.98  The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed and the defendant appealed.99  The Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that the imposition of multiple sentences for the same crime—bank
robbery—violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because proof of all elements to
sustain conviction under subsection (d) required proof of the same facts to sat-
isfy the elements under subsection (a).100
Furthermore, as to indictment, the Eighth Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit
before it, concluded that indictment under the FBRA and the Hobbs Act for
bank robbery does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.101
3. United States v. Holloway102
Twenty years after the Eighth Circuit concluded that punishment under
both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act resulted in a double jeopardy violation in
Golay, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion.  The
following is a brief recitation of the factual circumstances at issue in United
States v. Holloway.
On March 25, 1997, defendant Kenneth Holloway and an accomplice
entered the First United Services Credit Union in Alameda, California, carrying
firearms and demanding cash.103  While his accomplice took money from a
teller, Holloway “pistol-whipped” the manager and hit an employee.104  Hollo-
way and his accomplice fled the scene in a getaway car with a third accom-
plice.105  Police apprehended all three men minutes later.106
In May 1998, a jury found Holloway guilty of bank robbery in violation of
the FBRA for his participation in the robbery of the First United Services
Credit Union.107  Holloway appealed and the Ninth Circuit vacated the convic-
tion, concluding that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the prosecu-
98 Id.
99 Id. at 572.
100 See Prince, 352 U.S. at 329.
101 United States v. Golay, 560 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1977).
102 United States v. Holloway, 309 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2002).  The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed a double jeopardy challenge under the Acts and reached a different
conclusion in United States v. LaBinia in 1980. See United States v. LaBinia, 614 F.2d 1207
(9th Cir. 1980).  In LaBinia, the court concluded that although both Acts criminalize the
“same offense,” Congress intended a broad reading of the Hobbs Act such that a defendant
could (and would) be punished under both Acts for the “same offense.” Id. at 1209-10.  The
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Holloway departed from this precedent, in reliance on new
legislative history concerning the 1986 Amendment to the FBRA providing that the FBRA
should be the exclusive federal statute to criminalize bank extortion (and by analogy, bank
robbery). Holloway, 309 F.3d at 651-52.  For further discussion of the legislative history
concerning the amendment to the FBRA, see infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
103 See Appellee’s Answering Brief at 4-5, United States v. Holloway, 309 F.3d 649 (9th
Cir. 2002) (No. 01-10508).
104 Id. at 5.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Holloway, 309 F.3d at 651.  The jury also found Holloway guilty of carrying a firearm
in relation to a violent crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and of being a felon in possession of a
firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id.
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tion proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the requisite elements under the
FBRA to satisfy the conviction.108
Soon thereafter, the government secured a superseding indictment against
Holloway — this time for violating the Hobbs Act, again in connection with his
participation in the First United Services Credit Union bank robbery.109  Hollo-
way moved for dismissal of the Hobbs Act indictment on double jeopardy
grounds, which the district court denied.110
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court reversed and dismissed the Hobbs Act
indictment, concluding, “[a]ny offense under the FBRA is an offense included
within the Hobbs Act.”111  Specifically, the court concluded that the commerce
element required under the Hobbs Act is also satisfied by the facts necessary to
sustain a conviction for robbery of a “bank” under the FBRA.112  The Ninth
Circuit reasoned:
The power of Congress to create, support, or protect financial institutions is not
enumerated in the Constitution.  This power is implied from the enumerated power of
Congress to regulate commerce between the states.  Only financial institutions that
are instruments of interstate commerce fall within the protection of the FBRA.  To
rob an instrument of interstate commerce is to impede the flow of such commerce.113
Although Holloway differs procedurally from both Beck and Golay, the
case stands for the same principle that both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act pro-
scribe the “same offense,” such that punishment under both violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
B. Camp 2:  Sentencing Under both the FBRA and Hobbs Act Does Not
Violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
In this section, I discuss the cases from the Second and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals, concluding that subjecting a defendant to multiple punish-
ments under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause.  Until recently, the Second Circuit remained the lone federal
court of appeals to reach this conclusion.114  However, in 2007, the Eleventh
Circuit joined ranks with the Second Circuit on this matter, concluding punish-
ment under both Acts was permissible.115
1. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera116
In United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals considered appeals by four criminal defendants convicted of various




111 Id. at 652.
112 Id. at 651-52.
113 Id. at 652 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 353-54 (1819)).
114 See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1990).
115 See United States v. Reddick, No. 05-13169, 2007 WL 1540210, at *15 (11th Cir. May
29, 2007).
116 Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934.
117 Id. at 943.
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dant Juan Segarra-Palmer raised double jeopardy issues on appeal, this Note
only discusses the court’s opinion as it pertains to him.118  The trial court sen-
tenced Segarra to four concurrent twenty-year prison sentences for violations of
the FBRA to be followed by two concurrent twenty-years sentences for viola-
tions of the Hobbs Act based on his participation in an armed bank robbery of a
Wells Fargo Bank depot in West Hartford, Connecticut.119  Segarra and more
than fifteen co-conspirators stole a total of $7,017,151 from the depot.120
Segarra appealed his convictions, arguing that punishment under both the
FBRA and Hobbs Act for bank robbery violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause.121
The Second Circuit began its analysis under the Blockburger test by not-
ing that because both statutory offenses appear in different chapters of Title 18
of the United States Code, Congress intended for courts to impose separate
punishments for each offense.122  Next, the court concluded that a conviction
under the Hobbs Act required proof of a fact—that the robbery affected com-
merce—that is not statutorily required to sustain a conviction under the
FBRA.123  Consequently, the court reasoned that the FBRA and the Hobbs Act
do not proscribe the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes.124  Lastly,
the court discussed Congress’ purposes in enacting each criminal statute and
concluded that Congress’ “distinct legislative goals confirm the presumption
that Congress intended multiple punishments under these two sections.”125  The
court concluded that in enacting the Hobbs Act, Congress was principally con-
cerned with “protecting the flow of interstate commerce,” whereas in enacting
the FBRA, Congress was instead concerned with protecting federal banks.126
Consequently, it affirmed the sentences imposed by the lower court.127
2. United States v. Reddick128
Although an unreported case, the Eleventh Circuit’s recent discussion of
whether punishment under both Acts violates the Double Jeopardy Clause in
United States v. Reddick is instructive on this matter, for the court adopted a
different approach to the resolution of a multiple punishment challenge.129  The
following is a brief recitation of the facts and circumstances at issue in Reddick.
118 Id. at 944.  The other three defendants charged with participation in the bank robbery
included:  Roberto Jose Maldonado-Rivera, Antonio Camacho-Negron, and Norman Rami-
rez-Talavera. Id. at 943.
119 Id. at 943-44.  Note that defendant Segarra was also charged with other offenses for his
participation in the armed bank robbery. Id.  This discussion only addresses the charges
under the FBRA and the Hobbs Act.
120 Id. at 944.
121 Id. at 980.
122 Id. at 982.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 983.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 984.
128 United States v. Reddick, No. 05-13169, 2007 WL 1540210 (11th Cir. May 29, 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 204 (2007).
129 Id. at *14.
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On April 14, 2004, three masked men entered the Sun Trust Bank in Port
St. Lucie, Florida, brandishing firearms and demanding money.130  The men
ordered customers and bank employees to lie on the ground as they took money
from the teller drawers and vault.131  The men originally escaped with $60,381,
but after abandoning $46,600 in front of the building when a dye pack exploded
and marked the currency red, the total loss was reduced to $13,781.132  One of
the men entered into a plea agreement and identified defendant Rashard Red-
dick as a participant in the robbery.133
A jury found defendant Reddick guilty under both the FBRA and the
Hobbs Act for his participation in an armed bank robbery.134  The trial court
sentenced Reddick to concurrent sentences of 115 months imprisonment for
convictions under both Acts.135  Reddick appealed, asserting double jeopardy
challenges for indictment and punishment under both statutes.136  On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit Court dismissed Reddick’s double jeopardy challenges and
affirmed the trial court’s sentences.137
Contrary to other circuits, which reached differing conclusions in their
application of the Blockburger test—an inquiry which must be made under the
facts of each particular case—the Eleventh Circuit appears to have disregarded
the Blockburger test in favor of a new test.138  In Reddick, the court held that
the proper test to determine if two statutes criminalize the “same offense” for
double jeopardy purposes is whether a “hypothetical scenario” exists in which a
“hypothetical defendant might violate one [statute] without violating the
other.”139
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that bank robbery under the FBRA is not
the “same offense” as that proscribed under the Hobbs Act by analogizing to a
hypothetical scenario that the court believed would result in a defendant violat-
ing the FBRA, but not the Hobbs Act.140  Focusing on the commerce element,
the court opined:
[S]uppose that a person entered a federally chartered bank with the intent to steal a
collection of art that the bank has exhibited in its lobby.  He is armed.  He encounters
a security guard at gunpoint, who resists him, and who is able to overwhelm him
within seconds of entering the door.  The bank’s interstate commerce transactions are
not affected in any way as a result of the skirmish.  The Government could clearly
prosecute the individual under the FBRA, but not under the Hobbs Act.141
130 See First Brief for the Defendant-Appellant at 3, United States v. Reddick, No. 05-
13169, 2007 WL 1540210 (11th Cir. May 29, 2007) (No. 05-13169).
131 Id. at 3-4.
132 Id. at 4.
133 Id.
134 Reddick, 2007 WL 1540210, at *10.  The jury also convicted Reddick of conspiracy to
commit armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and brandishing a firearm during the
commission of a bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Id. at *9.
135 Id. at *10.
136 Id.
137 Id. at *15.
138 Id. at *14.
139 Id. (quoting United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 2007)).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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Relying on its “hypothetical scenario” test, the court concluded that the
sentencing of a defendant under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act for partici-
pation in an armed bank robbery does not result in a double jeopardy
violation.142
IV. BANK ROBBERY UNDER THE FBRA IS THE “SAME OFFENSE”
AS BANK ROBBERY UNDER THE HOBBS ACT
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to address whether punishment
under both Acts violates the Double Jeopardy Clause and resolve the ongoing
circuit-split in favor of the decisions rendered by the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits.  Under the Blockburger test, both statutes proscribe the “same
offense” because proof of the elements necessary to sustain a conviction under
the FBRA also results in proof of the facts necessary to sustain a conviction
under the Hobbs Act.  Additionally, a critical review of the legislative history
concerning the Acts indicates that Congress intended the FBRA to be the exclu-
sive federal statute to criminalize bank robbery.  Moreover, the Supreme Court
should utilize review of this issue as an opportunity to revisit its precedent
permitting multiple indictments for the “same offense” and conclude that
indictments for the “same offense” also violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
A. Multiple Punishment for Bank Robbery Violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause
In this section, I analyze the FBRA and the Hobbs Act under the three-step
multiple punishment analysis set forth above and conclude that punishment
under both Acts violates the Double Jeopardy Clause because the Acts
criminalize the “same offense.”  The first step of the multiple punishment anal-
ysis is easily satisfied, whereas the second and third steps require careful analy-
sis before reaching the ultimate conclusion that bank robbery under both the
FBRA and Hobbs Act constitute the “same offense.”  This section discusses the
three steps of this analysis as applied to the FBRA and Hobbs Act, in turn.
1. Step One:  Congress Intended to Authorize Punishment Under Both
Criminal Statutes
The first step of this analysis requires a court to review the language of the
statutory offenses to determine if Congress intended to authorize punishment
under each statute.143  As set forth earlier, if two offenses are located in differ-
ent sections of the United States Code or in different chapters within the same
section, courts presume that Congress intended to authorize punishment for
violations under each statute.144
Under the first step of this analysis, courts presume that Congress intended
to punish conduct resulting in violations of both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act,
because although both statutes are located in Title 18 of the United States Code,
142 Id. at *15.
143 United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 981 (2d Cir. 1990).
144 Id.
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they appear in different chapters.145  The FBRA is located in the chapter enti-
tled “Robbery and Burglary,” whereas the Hobbs Act is located in the chapter
entitled “Racketeering.”146  This placement satisfies the first step requiring
each statute be set out in different sections of the United States Code.
2. Step Two:  The FBRA and Hobbs Act Require Proof of the Same
Facts
The second step of this analysis requires a court to perform a textual anal-
ysis to determine if one of the criminal statutes requires proof of a fact that the
other criminal statute does not.147  Courts should conduct the textual analysis in
light of the facts concerning each particular defendant.148
A side-by-side comparison of the elements required to establish violations
under both statutes for bank robbery demonstrates that the Hobbs Act calls for
proof of an element that is not required to sustain a conviction under the FBRA
— that the robbery affects interstate commerce.149  Although on its face the
Hobbs Act requires proof of an element that the FBRA does not, the following
analysis establishes that both Acts criminalize the “same offense” because the
same facts are required to establish:  under the Hobbs Act, that the robbery
affected commerce; and, under the FBRA, that the place of robbery was a
“bank” as defined by the statute.
Courts have broadly interpreted the interstate commerce requirement
under the Hobbs Act to require only proof of a small affect on interstate com-
merce.150  As described by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Farley,151 generally “only a de minimus showing of a reasonably probable
effect” on commerce is necessary to prove that a robbery delayed, obstructed,
or otherwise affected commerce.152  For example, the Ninth Circuit concluded
in United States v. Lynch153 that robbery of an individual involved in the distri-
bution and sale of methamphetamines satisfied the interstate commerce require-
ment under the Hobbs Act.154  The Second Circuit has similarly found a
tenuous relationship to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement.155  In
United States v. Mapp,156 the Second Circuit held that robbery of a customer
145 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 2113 (2006).
146 See generally id. §§ 1951, 2113.
147 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); RUDSTEIN, supra note 14,
at 74-76.
148 Compare Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (performing an analysis under the particular
facts of the defendant’s case), with United States v. Reddick, No. 05-13169, 2007 WL
1540210, at *14 (11th Cir. May 29, 2007) (proposing a hypothetical test to ascertain if any
defendant could have violated one statute and not the other).
149 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951, with 18 U.S.C. § 2113.
150 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes Obstruction, Delay, or Effect on Commerce
for Purposes of Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1951)—Robbery Cases, 23 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1
(2007).
151 United States v. Farley, 760 F. Supp. 461 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff’d without opinion 947
F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
152 Id. at 463.
153 United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2006).
154 Id. at 911.
155 See generally United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1999).
156 Mapp, 170 F.3d 328.
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while standing in line at a bank constituted an affect on commerce such that
conviction under the Hobbs Act was proper.157
The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals reason that proof
of robbery of a “bank” under the FBRA satisfies the interstate commerce
requirement under the Hobbs Act because banks are instruments of commerce.
This proposition has been long standing precedent ever since the Supreme
Court first opined that Congress had the implied authority to create a bank
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, among other enumerated Article I powers of
the United States Constitution, in McCulloch v. Maryland.158  Consequently,
the argument follows that robbery of a “bank,” an instrument of commerce,
thereby affects commerce.  The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion by rea-
soning, “[t]o rob an instrument of interstate commerce is to impede the flow of
such commerce.”159  As bank robbery necessarily affects commerce, a bank
robbery offense under the FBRA is the “same offense” as a bank robbery under
the Hobbs Act because both statutes require proof of the same facts.
Under traditional double jeopardy jurisprudence, a court is required to per-
form its multiple punishment analysis under the Blockburger test with refer-
ence to the particular facts of the case before it.160  Even if the Supreme Court
were to disregard precedent calling for a determination made on the facts of the
case and adopt the “hypothetical scenario” test set forth by the Eleventh Circuit
in Reddick to address this issue, it must still logically conclude that bank rob-
bery under the FBRA and the Hobbs Act are the “same offense” under the facts
of the “hypothetical scenario” test forth by the court.161  In Reddick, the court
hypothesized that bank robbery under the FBRA does not affect commerce if a
defendant attempts to steal artwork from a bank’s lobby.162  This reasoning is
flawed.
A defendant who commits attempted bank robbery, whether in an effort to
steal money or the artwork hanging on the bank’s lobby wall, violates the
Hobbs Act because the defendant, in both instances, seeks to deprive the bank
of its assets.  As the Ninth Circuit stated in Holloway, “To rob an instrument of
interstate commerce is to impede the flow of such commerce.”163  Seeking to
rob a bank of any of its property, even the art hanging on its lobby wall,
impedes the operations of the bank by resulting in the delay of conducting bank
transactions.  Any delay in bank operations, however short, satisfies the
requirement under the Hobbs Act because “only a de minimus showing of a
reasonably probable effect” on commerce is necessary to satisfy the commerce
requirement.164
157 Id. at 331 n.4.
158 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 353 (1819).
159 United States v. Holloway, 309 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 2002).
160 See generally RUDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 74-76.
161 I do not endorse adoption of the hypothetical test, and merely discuss the results reached
if the Court were to adopt it.
162 United States v. Reddick, No. 05-13169, 2007 WL 1540210, at *14 (11th Cir. May 29,
2007).
163 Holloway, 309 F.3d at 652.
164 United States v. Farley, 760 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff’d without opinion
947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
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In sum, the second step of this analysis provides that punishment for bank
robbery under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act presumptively violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause because such punishment is for committing the “same
offense.”  However, the third step of this analysis provides that multiple pun-
ishments do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if Congress specifically
intended to subject defendants to multiple punishments for committing the
“same offense.”165  Thus, the next and final step in this analysis is to determine
if Congress nonetheless intended to impose multiple punishments for bank
robbery.
3. Step Three:  Legislative History Indicates that Congress Intended
the FBRA to be the Exclusive Provision for Proscribing Bank
Robbery
A review of the legislative history concerning both the FBRA and Hobbs
Act reveals that Congress intended bank robbery offenses to be punished exclu-
sively under the FBRA.
a. The Hobbs Act
An examination of the Congressional record reveals that Congress’ pri-
mary motivation in enacting the Hobbs Act was to “protect interstate commerce
from robbery and extortion, no matter by whom these crimes were commit-
ted.”166  The legislative history behind adoption of the Hobbs Act does not
reveal that Congress was concerned with bank robbery in enacting the statute.
Rather, the record is replete with indications that Congress was principally
motivated in overturning United States v. Local 807 International Brotherhood
of Teamsters,167 a Supreme Court case holding that the Anti-Racketeering Act
of 1934, a precedent to the Hobbs Act, did not apply to extortionate labor activ-
ities.168  For example, when discussing the Hobbs Act, Representative Hancock
declared:  “[T]his bill is made necessary by the amazing decision of the
Supreme Court in [Local 807] . . . [which] practically nullified the anti-racke-
teering bill of 1934.”169  Congress responded by passing the Hobbs Act a few
years later, which broadly proscribes extortionate conduct, including such con-
duct by union members, by applying to “[w]hoever in any way or degree
obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by robbery or extortion . . . .”170
165 See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).
166 91 CONG. REC. 11,904 (1945) (statement of Rep. Gwynne of Iowa).
167 United States v. Local 807 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
168 See generally id.  In Local 807, the government charged members of a New York City
truck driving union with violating the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 for engaging in violent
intimidation tactics against local farmers. Id. at 525-27.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held
that the union’s activities were not chargeable as extortion under the statute because the law
specifically excluded application to organization activities seeking wage payment. Id. at
530-31.  As the Court found that the union’s activities were not within the purview of the
current anti-racketeering statute, it concluded that the government could not charge the
union. Id.  For more discussion concerning Congress’ response to Local 807, see James
Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion:  From the Common Law
to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 889-91 (1988).
169 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock).
170 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006).
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b. The FBRA
Congress passed the FBRA in 1934 to “[protect] the institutions in which
[the Federal Government] is interested.”171  Congress amended the FBRA in
1986.172  In amending the FBRA, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted,
“[f]ederal courts are divided over the question whether [the FBRA] proscribes
extortionate conduct.”173  In addition, the Committee clearly set forth its pur-
pose in amending the FRBA in House Report 797, which provides:
Extortionate conduct is prosecutable either under the bank robbery provision or the
Hobbs Act, both of which carry the same maximum prison term (20 years). However,
clarification as to which should be the applicable statute is desirable.
The Justice Department believes that the natural and appropriate vehicle for
prosecuting extortionate activity involving the obtaining of bank monies is 18 U.S.C.
2113(a), rather than the Hobbs Act, which has the purpose of safeguarding the chan-
nels of interstate and foreign commerce from the adverse effects of robbery and
extortion.  The Committee concurs. Accordingly, section 51 amends 18 U.S.C.
2113(a) expressly to cover crimes of extortion directed at federally insured banks.
The Committee intends to overrule those cases holding that only the Hobbs Act
applies, and those cases holding that both the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. 2113(a)
apply, in order to make 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) the exclusive provision for prosecuting
bank extortion.174
Although addressing a multiple punishment argument under both Acts in
1990, after Congress amended the FBRA in 1986, the Second Circuit con-
cluded in Maldonado-Rivera that Congress did not intend the FBRA to be the
exclusive criminal statute to charge defendants with for bank robbery
offenses.175  An examination of the Second Circuit’s discussion of the relevant
legislative history in Maldonado-Rivera reveals the court’s analytical error.
In 1982, in United States v. Marrale176 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals examined the legislative history of the FBRA and concluded, “the
Congressional debates centered on how best to protect federal banks, not on
how to protect interstate or foreign commerce.”177  The court later relied on its
prior examination of the FBRA’s legislative history in Marrale in reaching its
decision in Maldonado-Rivera in 1990.178  Overlooking the 1986 Amendment
to the FBRA, the Second Circuit concluded that Congress intended to impose
multiple punishment for bank robbery with respect to the FBRA and the Hobbs
Act.179  The court’s reliance on the legislative history of the FBRA in Marrale
was clearly improper because Marrale was decided in 1982, prior to Congress’
171 United States v. Marrale, 695 F.2d 658, 664 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-
1461, at 2 (1934)).
172 See generally Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-646, 100 Stat. 3592.
173 H.R. REP. NO. 99-797, at 32 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6138, 6155.
174 Id. at 32-33, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6138, 6156 (emphasis added).
175 See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 983 (2d Cir. 1990).
176 United States v. Marrale, 695 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1982).
177 Id. at 664.
178 Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 983.
179 Id.
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amendment to the FBRA in 1986 to clearly provide that the FBRA is the exclu-
sive criminal statute proscribing bank extortion.180
As Congress clearly indicated in the 1986 Amendment that the govern-
ment should prosecute an individual for bank extortion exclusively under provi-
sions of the FBRA, it would be absurd to conclude that Congress intended for
the government to prosecute an individual for bank robbery under both Acts.
The review of the House Committee on the Judiciary’s report concerning adop-
tion of the 1986 Amendment requires one to draw the logical connection that
bank robbery, like bank extortion, both similarly proscribed under the FBRA
and within the purview of the Hobbs Act, should be solely prosecuted under the
FBRA.  The connection is not a far reach, as the House Report provides that
“extortion” as used in subsection (a) of the FBRA means “obtaining property
from another person, without the other person’s consent, induced by the wrong-
ful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear” — a definition encom-
passing robbery.181
Thus, this analysis confirms that Congress intended the FBRA to be the
exclusive criminal statute for the prosecution of bank robbery.182  In sum, this
three-step analysis for multiple punishment warrants the conclusion that bank
robbery under both the FBRA and Hobbs Act criminalize the “same offense,”
such that punishing a defendant under both violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
B. Indictment under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act for Bank Robbery
Runs Afoul of Double Jeopardy Principles
Resolution of this circuit-split surrounding multiple punishment under the
FBRA and the Hobbs Act for bank robbery provides the Supreme Court with
an opportunity to revisit its long established precedent permitting multiple
indictments for the “same offense.”  Upon review of this issue, the Court
should, in line with members of the Court, both past and present, conclude that
said practice violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Doing so would prevent
prejudice to the defendant.
Under current doctrine, the government may seek multiple indictments
against a defendant for the “same offense” without violating the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause.183  This practice results in adverse consequences, however, and as
articulated by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Duncan,184 “may falsely
suggest to a jury that a defendant has committed not one but several crimes.”185
As a result, defendants are more likely to be found guilty when charged under a
180 Id. (citing Marrale, 695 F.2d at 664).
181 H.R. REP. NO. 99-797, at 32-33 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6138, 6156.
182 Id., as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6138, 6156.
183 See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985).
184 United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1988).
185 Id. at 1108 n.4. See also United States v. Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1986)
(multi-count indictments create the impression to the jury that a defendant engaged in more
criminal activity than in fact occurred); 1A WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 28, § 142, at 11
(expressing concern that multi-count indictments for the same offense “may have some psy-
chological effect upon a jury by suggesting to it that defendant has committed not one but
several crimes” (quoting United States v. Ketchum, 320 F.2d 3, 7 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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multiple indictment for the “same offense” than when charged with violating a
single criminal statute.186
In Missouri v. Hunter, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued in his dissent
that charging a defendant with multiple indictments for the same offense vio-
lated the Double Jeopardy Clause.187  Justice Marshall rejected multiple indict-
ment practice for the “same offense” and stated:
When multiple charges are brought, the defendant is ‘put in jeopardy’ as to each
charge.  To retain his freedom, the defendant must obtain an acquittal on all charges;
to put the defendant in prison, the prosecution need only obtain a single guilty ver-
dict.  The prosecution’s ability to bring multiple charges increases the risk that the
defendant will be convicted on one or more of those charges.188
A number of psychological studies have confirmed Justice Marshall’s con-
cerns.  Social science reveals that joinder of multiple indictments for the com-
mission of a single crime results in a bias against the defendant such that a jury
is more likely to find the defendant guilty on at least one count.189
1. Multiple Indictments Unfairly Favor the Prosecution
Permitting the government to charge defendants with multiple indictments
increases the prosecution’s ability to obtain a guilty verdict.190  Justices
Thurgood Marshall and Abe Fortas expressed concern that jurors are likely to
render a “compromise verdict” when a defendant faces multiple indictments.191
As described by Justice Fortas, a verdict is “compromised” when the jury finds
the defendant guilty of one, but not all charges for the “same offense.”192  Jus-
tice Fortas reasoned that the vice of multiple indictments is that they “induce a
doubtful jury to find the defendant guilty of the less serious offense rather than
to continue the debate as to his innocence.”193  As stated by another court,
compromise verdicts “pose significant threats to the proper functioning of the
jury system” because they result in jurors falsely concluding that the defendant
must be guilty of at least one charge if the government took the effort to charge
the defendant with multiple indictments for one crime.194
In United States v. Ball,195 in which the Supreme Court condoned the
government practice of indicting defendants on multiple counts for the “same
offense,” Justice John Paul Stevens expressed concerns with the Court giving
credence to this practice.  Justice Stevens remarked in his concurrence, “I see
no reason why this Court should go out of its way to encourage prosecutors to
tilt the scales of justice against the defendant by employing such tactics.”196
186 See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
187 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 371-72 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 372.
189 See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
190 See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
191 See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 371-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Cichos v. Indiana, 385
U.S. 76, 81 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari)).
192 Cichos, 385 U.S. at 81 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
193 Id.
194 United States v. Clarridge, 811 F. Supp. 697, 702 (D.D.C. 1992).
195 Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
196 Id. at 867. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Echoing Justice Stevens, I believe that such a “tilt [of] the scales of justice”197
offends the principles of the Double Jeopardy Clause by putting the defendant
“twice . . . in jeopardy”198 for offenses for which he or she could (and should)
not be punished twice.
2. Defendants are More Likely to be Found Guilty of at Least One
Offense When Charged with Multiple Indictments
Proponents of multiple indictments for the “same offense” often justify the
practice as harmless, arguing that admission of the same evidence for proof of
other charges does not result in prejudice to the defendant at trial.199  Recent
psychological studies reveal, however, that charging a defendant with multiple
indictments for the “same offense” results in significant prejudice.
Social psychology studies demonstrate that juries are more likely to find a
defendant guilty of the “same offense” when charged with multiple indictments
than when the government charges the same defendant under a single indict-
ment.200  For example, researchers from Purdue University and the University
of Wisconsin investigated the psychological effects on joined trials of multiple
offenses and concluded that the joinder of charges for similar offenses at trial is
more prejudicial than the joinder of dissimilar offenses.201  The study presented
participants with videotaped footage of criminal trials and varied the number of
offenses the government charged the defendant with, the similarity of the addi-
tional charges and the similarity of the evidence admitted at trial.202
The results of the study demonstrated that jurors are more likely to find a
defendant guilty of at least one offense when charged with multiple offenses
than when the government charged the defendant with a single offense.203
Moreover, the results of the study indicated that joinder of similar offenses at
trial may result in more prejudice towards the defendant than joinder of dissim-
ilar offenses.204  Such a tendency for juror bias confirms that indictments for
the “same offense,” as well as multiple punishments, can result in double jeop-
ardy violations.
Psychological data demonstrates that proponents’ arguments in favor of
multiple indictments for the “same offense” are flawed.  The Supreme Court
should conclude that indictment under both the FBRA and the Hobbs Act for
bank robbery also violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Permitting the govern-
ment to secure a conviction under one of the statutes by charging the defendant
197 Id.
198 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
199 See, e.g., United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997, 1000 (6th Cir. 1975).
200 See generally Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 32; Irwin A. Horowitz, Kenneth S. Bor-
dens & Marc. S. Feldman, A Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in Severed and Joined Crimi-
nal Trials, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 444 (1980); Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social
Inference Processes in Juror Judgments of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 749 (1984); Sarah Tanford, Steven Penrod & Rebecca Collins, Decision
Making in Joined Criminal Trials:  The Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity,
and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1985).
201 See generally Tanford, Penrod & Collins, supra note 200.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 334-35.
204 Id. at 335.
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under both, when punishment under both is unconstitutional, allows the govern-
ment to improperly, as Justice Stevens would say, “tilt the scales of justice.”205
The practice of permitting multiple indictments for a single offense undermines
the Double Jeopardy Clause, as it permits prejudicial effects by allowing
defendants to be “twice put in jeopardy”206 for committing the “same offense.”
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit-split in favor of the rulings
of the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals to conclude that mul-
tiple punishments under the FBRA and the Hobbs Act violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause.  As proof of the same facts necessary to secure a conviction for
bank robbery under the FBRA necessarily satisfies the elements necessary to
prove bank robbery under the Hobbs Act, both Acts proscribe the “same
offense.”  Moreover, punishment under both statutes is unconstitutional
because Congress intended the FBRA to be the sole criminal statute under
which for the government may prosecute bank robbery.
Furthermore, resolution of the circuit-split will provide the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to review the current practice of permitting the government
to charge defendants with multiple counts for committing the same offense.
This practice diminishes the integrity of the criminal justice system by permit-
ting prosecutors to charge defendants with more offenses than a court can con-
stitutionally convict a defendant of in an effort to enhance the government’s
ability to secure a conviction.  As psychological data demonstrates that charg-
ing defendants with multiple indictments for the same offense results in a preju-
dicial effect to defendants and increases the likelihood of a defendant’s guilt at
trial, the Court should conclude that multiple indictments for the same offense,
as well as multiple punishment, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
205 Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 867 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
206 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
